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ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION:
How VALID AN ALTERNATIVE?

by William J. Magavem

I. INTRODUCTION
During the last twenty years a sharp rise in the frequency and intensity of environmental conflict has coincided with increasing experimentation with informal
methods of dispute resolution. These developments have
spurred interest, over the past decade or so, in efforts to
resolve environmental disputes outside of the realm of formal adjudication. Public officials, environmentalists, corporations, attorneys, scholars, foundations and journalists
have contributed to a growing body of literature on the
topic, and various methods of alternative dispute resolution have been applied to environmental conflicts.
Alternative environmental dispute resolution attempts
to respond to the perceived inadequacy of formal adjudication in dealing with complex environmental problems. Its
proponents are skeptical of the ability of legally trained
judges to resolve intricate scientific questions.' The environmental movement has forced consideration of the
costs and limits of abusing our natural and human
resources, and many of the resulting battles have been
fought through litigation. Advocates of informalism argue
that the disputants themselves are better positioned than
judges to understand environmental problems, explore solutions that address substantive issues, and ultimately reach
2
and implement agreement.
The significance of the many proposals for alternative
dispute resolution is difficult to gauge because, as Bryant
Garth has observed, "informalism is a banner under which
different persons and groups can pursue their own substantive ends."3 Those marching under the banner have included both defenders of the status quo and advocates of
radical social change.
Of the various methods of dispute resolution, the alternative most favored for resolving environmental conflicts
has been mediation. An experienced environmental
mediator describes mediation as, "a voluntary process
characterized by the intervention of an impartial third
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party."4 From Gerald Cormick's mediation of the
Washington State Snoqualmie River flood control project
dispute in 1973 through mid-1984, more than 160 environmental disputes were mediated.' Organizations have
been established to offer mediation services and powerful
institutions have sponsored research and practice of environmental mediation.
The purposes of this article are, first, to demonstrate
the weaknesses of one type of environmental mediation
and, secondly, to suggest another type of mediation.
II. LEGALISTIC MEDIATION:
THE WORST OF BOTH WORLDS
Much of the environmental mediation literature
describes a process that actually resembles litigation. This
legalistic type of mediation is usually touted for its ability
to do what courts aim to do, and it has a symbiotic relationship with the judicial system.
Advocates of quasi-legal mediation advance several rationales for its superiority to litigation as a method of resolving some disputes. Many adopt the efficiency argument,
asserting that mediation is cheaper and quicker than environmental lawsuits that often drag on for years at great
expense.6 Another rationale for mediation is that it reduces
caseloads and enhances the effectiveness of the courts.7
The result of a system of informal justice existing side-byside with traditional formal justice, according to this
scenario, would be more efficiency all around.
Resolving Environmental Disputes by the Conservation Foundation's Gail Bingham debunks the myth that
alternative environmental dispute resolution is much
cheaper and quicker than litigation. That myth, though
never tested previously, had become accepted as fact simply because its advocates had repeated it so many times. 8
The available facts indicate that the number of environmental lawsuits in federal courts declined slightly between the
mid-70s and the early '80s, that over 90% of the environmental suits in federal court during a twelve-month
period in 1982-83 never went to trial, and that the median
time for all environmental suits from the same sample was
ten months from filing to disposition. For the available information on cases resolved informally, the median duration was five-to-six months, hardly an enormous time saving. Although Bingham lacks sufficient data to draw direct
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comparisons of expenses, she notes that mediators' time
and expenses are costly, and that some citizens and environmental groups have found that mediation may cost
them more than litigation.9
Whether environmental mediation could ever handle
enough cases to substantially reduce judicial caseloads is
also questionable. Several experienced environmental
mediators, who stand to gain from the use of mediation,
agree that about ten percent of environmental disputes can
be successfully mediated.' 0
To the extent that widespread use of environmental
mediation would divert cases from the traditional legal
system, it would reproduce litigation's power inequalities
in an even more distorted form. Informality based on
efficiency criteria may well further disadvantage poor and
underprivileged parties, who would lose the protections (inadequate as they often are) of formal procedure. 1' The
problem of power will return later, as it is a major drawback
to informal justice.
Mediation's proponents claim as an asset its ability to
balance the rights and interests of the parties. That claim
reveals how dependent quasi-legal mediation is on the
American legal model of adjudication, with its basis in rights
theory and its reliance on balancing.
Quasi-legal mediation's resemblance to formal legalism
is further demonstrated by its practice, which seeks to narrow the issues through a structured process. 2 The
mediator plays a directing role in this process, and the
disputing parties rarely communicate with each other face
to face. For example, in the Foothills Water Project dispute
in the Denver area, Representative (now Senator) Tim
Wirth brought the parties together and pushed them to an
agreement."'

Professor Lawrence Susskind attributes Wirth's success in the Foothills case in great part to his political clout,
and recommends that mediators be persons with clout that
can be exercised to bring recalcitrant parties into line. He
also proposes that mediation be tied into the legal system
by making mediators legally accountable, with their responsibilities spelled out either in legislation or a contract.
Susskind's criteria for a successful mediation bear significant resemblance to adjudicatory standards; he maintains
that the mediation must reconcile the interests of the parties, should be reached 14quickly and at low cost, and should
set a good precedent.

Susskind's idea of accountability tied to contract or
statute would impose a rigid structure that would preclude
the flexibility needed to raise new issues or seek new solutions. In addition, making mediators liable to lawsuits would
inhibit the mediation process by giving the mediator such
a large personal stake in the outcome that she would have
serious personal interests of her own to protect.'Maximizing the role and clout of the third-party intervenor raises problems of power and coercion. A
mediator with political pull might have real or perceived conflicts of interest. Also, if the mediator can use the stated
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or implied threat of coercion in another forum to bring the
parties to agreement, as Rep. Wirth did in the Foothills
case, the "voluntariness" of the settlement is dubious. At
what point does an agreement to accept a powerful
mediator's intervention become just a concession to greater
political power? Such a process may not even be one
legitimately characterized as mediation. 6
Even when the mediator does not have personal power
to coerce, most environmental mediations are conducted
with the threat of litigation looming overhead. The connection between formal and informal justice again becomes
evident. Since a breakdown in the mediation process will
almost inevitably lead to litigation, the parties' relative
resources will play a part in determining their positions. In
this way the mediation process is similar to the settlement
of a lawsuit, where the judge's coercive power overshadows
negotiations and consent is often coerced. 7
Like settlement, mediation is often a function of inequality in the parties' ability to finance litigation. The poorer
party may be disadvantaged in bargaining by a lesser access to knowledge, may be forced to mediate by an inability
to afford litigation, or may be in a position of needing an
agreement right away.1 8 Even if the facts do not support
the idea that mediation is quicker than litigation in general,
it is quicker than suits that actually go to trial.' 9
In the arena of environmental conflict, though, the
threat of delay and prolonged litigation sometimes benefits
a party with relatively smaller resources. Citizens groups
are often able to obtain concessions from corporate
developers by threatening to stall proposed projects. On
the other hand, in a toxic dump controversy like that at
Love Canal, delays in cleanup and compensation harm the
interests of resource-poor citizens who are victims of corporate and governmental malfeasance. So the threat of
potential suit can work both ways.
What must be recognized is that mediation is "by its
essence a process of power exchange." 20 To provide the
incentive to negotiate, each side must have some power
over the other. If the power is not evenly balanced, one
side will be able to coerce the other.
Even some advocates of environmental mediation concede that individuals and small citizens organizations might
be better off using litigation against powerful corporations
and governmental agencies. The lawsuit provides leverage,
can educate the public and galvanize opinion, may influence
legislation, and has the potential to strengthen environmen2
tal organizations; "litigation offers empowerment." 1
Informal procedures, on the other hand, "may turn
into tools for the advantaged." 22 The claims of the politically
and financially weak may fall victim to the status quo. In
any dispute resolution process with a strong third-party intervenor, the latter must have some idea of fairness as a
basis for settlement. If that notion of fairness is not based
on law, there is a danger that raw power will become the
dominant force. That danger will be present whenever the
mediator actively directs the process or exercises
32
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authority.
Only the naive would maintain that raw power is absent from the formal adjudicative process. The powerless
would fare even worse in informalism, though, as Garth
points out:
Informalism eliminates procedures that can
have an impact on results independent of
relative power relationships. Formalities create
barriers, but they also provide a shield behind
which it is possible to achieve a politically un24
popular result.
Environmentalists who challenge the status quo should
also be suspicious of another property of informal justice
its capacity for neutralizing conflict. When mediation
is conducted in the legalistic mode, by narrowing issues
and bargaining for a one-time exchange of rights and
benefits, it responds to specific grievances in ways that inhibit the development of a critique of the broad social
causes of problems or the empowerment of a community.
Rather than handling disputes in a public courtroom with
its openly adversarial style, mediation employs backroom
bargaining to reach decisions that, especially in the environmental area, may have major public significance.
There is a myth that "mediation is a good way to avoid
conflict,"25 that it is non-adversarial and can resolve basic
difference. That image can foster the idea that, "if we just
get together in private and talk over our disputes, we can
reach agreement." Informal justice inhibits the addressing
of the fundamental causes of environmental conflict and
prevents essential differences from reaching public attention. 26 The result is usually that significant changes in environmental problems are stymied.
The CERCLA, or "superfund," mechanism for handling toxic-waste liability provides an example of how informalism (though not mediation in this example) can deflate
conflict. Like workers' compensation and no-fault compensation for automobile injuries, CEROLA simplifies rules of
liability and entitlement, increases the proportion of claims
paid, and reduces the amounts paid; anger is defused by
money, not by public participation.27 Environmental mediation could have a similar effect when it seeks to satisfy individual grievances by avoiding open conflict over what is
happening to the ecology.
The balancing-of-rights-and-interests model for environmental mediation also has the effect of influencing
disputants to curtail some of their demands in the interest
of reaching an agreement and moving toward some common ground. That approach ignores the fact that, for the
environmentalist group, the way to resolve the conflict is
for the polluter to stop polluting.2 8 In any dispute, each party will claim that its right outweighs the other's, and mediation offers no better solution than does judicial balancing.
Mediation will often offer a worse solution, in fact, by asking a party to compromise on an uncompromisable posi34

tion. For example, an environmental group taking a firm
no-discharge stand against toxic effluents in the Niagara
River might sacrifice too much credibility and principle if
it negotiated an agreement allowing a specified level of
discharge.
In Settling Things, published by the Ford Foundation
and the Conservation Foundation, Alan Talbot
acknowledges that most environmental disputes can not
be mediated and that determining which disputes can be
mediated is not easy to do.2 9 Talbot concludes that mediation is a "supplement, rather than an alternative, to legal
action in environmental disputes," recognizes that the threat
of court action provided the impetus for mediation in most
of the conflicts he studied, and praises the participation
of lawyers in each of his six case studies."0 The vision of
mediation that emerges is a procedure that serves as a kind
of adjunct to the formal legal system, to be called on in
certain undefined circumstances, with the knowledge that
the dispute will end up in court if the process fails.
The need for such a new mechanism is questionable,
however most environmental disputes are already
resolved without a formal adjudication, either because the
developer obtains agency and citizen consent before a formal licensing proceeding, or because a settlement is
negotiated before litigation moves beyond the preliminary
stage.3 1 If informal processes in the shadow of litigation
are already resolving disputes that are capable of being
negotiated, there seems little point in creating new institutions and funding mechanisms to do the same thing with
a fancier name. The cases that are fully litigated are usually those that are especially important to both sides or that
require a judicial statement of what the law is, so are probably not amenable to mediation.3 2 In sum, the negotiable
cases are already being settled out of court, and the nonnegotiable cases, almost by definition, can not be settled
out of court. Although a nonlegal mediation process that
seeks to expand issues and find creative solutions might
be able to resolve some of the latter cases, the legalistic,
issue-narrowing approach would not.
Another problem with environmental mediation is that
it privatizes decisions that often carry important public consequences. In adjudication, public officials, whose powers
are defined by law, settle disputes according to the values
encoded in statutes and state and federal constitutions.33
Parties in private mediation will be under no obligation to
consider public policy, as judges are. Our method of resolving fundamental policy differences, no matter how unsatisfactory it often is, involves governmental institutions.
Private environmental settlements may not follow legislative
or agency-mandated standards, to the detriment of the
public.3 4 Judge Harry Edwards warns that, "environmental mediation and negotiation present the danger that environmental standards will be set by private groups without
the democratic checks of governmental institutions."3 5
True, agencies are often "captured" by the private interests
they were established to regulate, but moving environmenINTHE PuBUC INrTEST

tal decision-making even further away from public accountability does not appear to be a step in the right direction.
Proponents of environmental mediation are trying to
make a case for public funding of their private method of
dispute resolution, 36 so the question of who would benefit
from such funding must be addressed. Demand for environmental mediation has come, not from a grass-roots
public movement, but from the professional elite. As
Cormick says, "the strongest boosters of alternative dispute
resolution tend to be those who are 'third parties' - or
would like to be."3 7 A new "profession" of mediation may
be developing. Lawyers need not fear for their fees, either.
Many attorneys will probably become mediators themselves, while others will represent clients in mediation. It
should not be too surprising, then, that the organized bar
has not been hostile to mediation; not only are lawyers experienced.negotiators, but they are in the best position to
assess the relative strength of their client's position in the
legal or administrative proceeding that will follow if mediation fails.3 8 As long as mediation functions as an adjunct
to the formal legal system, with the threat of adjudication
ever present, lawyers will be crucial to mediation.
A legalistic type of mediation process that operates
in the shadow of the courtroom, relies on the direction of
a strong third-party intervenor, and seeks to narrow the
issues and balance the rights and interests of private
parties offers the worst of both worlds. Such an approach
combines the coerciveness, rigidity and issue narrowing of
adjudication with the power imbalances, unaccountability
and privatization of informal justice.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE KIND OF MEDIATION
Mediation does have the capability to resolve some
disputes more satisfactorily than litigation does, and environmental mediation has indeed scored some victories.
What mediation offers that adjudication does not (at least
not as well) is the potential to expand the issues involved,
as well as a recognition of the importance of ongoing
relationships.
Issue-expanding mediation justifies itself not by a rationale of efficiency but by idealism, the search for new and
better solutions. Instead of narrowing issues and balancing rights and interests, it tries to expand the range of
possibilities. And rather than supplementing the formal legal
system's ability to adjudicate individual grievances, it may
develop a critique of the broader social causes of environmental problems and may empower the community
involved to take an active role in protecting the environment, though these elements do not always emerge.
A good example of a successful issue-expanding
mediation is the controversy over siting of a new ferry landing in Port Townsend, Washington. 39 Before the mediation a stalemate prevailed, with the State Transportation
Department and some residents proposing one site and a
group of newer residents opposing it. After several exasperating mediation meetings, one of the negotiators proSPRING 1988

duced a completely new plan that met with unanimous
agreement. The mediator, George Yount, described his role
as "part conductor and part psychologist." Yount did little
more than ask questions, open and close meetings, and
call breaks when frustration was mounting. He succeeded
in facilitating communication until the new solution
emerged.
Successful and innovative mediation processes are
built on relationships. Cormick says that the word
"mediator" itself "describes a relationship between the intervenor and the disputants. 40 Rather than emphasizing
political clout, he stresses trust:
Mediation is a fragile process built on trust, first,
of the mediator and subsequently, between
those directly involved. It is this trust that can
lead to sharing confidences, exploring alternatives and reaching and implementing an

agreement.41
Unlike adjudication, mediation is more about process than

structure.4" Mediation built on relationships strives for
mutual understanding between the parties and open expression of feelings and attitudes, rather than bargaining
for trade-offs of interests. 43 Rather than trying to impose
his own solution, the mediator should encourage the parties to communicate directly. In fact, mediators with personal expertise in a particular area under dispute are less
likely to be effective than those without expertise, because
the former will try to lead the parties and rely on their own
assessments, values and assumptions. 44 Mediators who are
"part conductor, part psychologist" can avoid many of the
problems of the mediator with clout and legal accountability. The accountability proposal reinforces the myth that
mediators are responsible for the quality of the agreement,
but actually the parties will be better at finding solutions
45
than the mediator is.
Although the possibility of litigation can not be completely removed from any dispute resolution process,
mediation can be conducted in a way that, if successful,
makes the prospect of litigation irrelevant. Mediation
based on relationships aims to reach a collective agreement
that recognizes the parties' shared interests and ongoing
relationship and enforces itself 46 Many environmental
disputes, even those that have been litigated, involve ongoing relationships, so the parties often have incentives to
talk with each other - each knows it will be dealing with
the other in the future.
Although issue-expanding mediation based on relationships has the potential to turn some "zero-sum" conflicts
into "everybody wins" situations, the problems of power
inequality, depoliticization of conflict and privatizing of
decision-making will remain troublesome in most environmental conflicts. Consequently, mediation should not
be institutionalized as a regular method of settling environmental disputes. One of its premier practitioners has

expressed concern over:
the danger that mediation can and will be
used to replace or short-circuit existing processes. It is our view that mediation must remain an extraordinary process applied to
carefully selected situations in order to maintain its credibility and viability. Should it ever
become another "hoop to jump through," it will
47
inevitably be destroyed.
Efforts to provide government funding for environmental
mediation or to establish it as an adjunct to the judicial
system should be rejected.
Public funds would more effectively serve the environmental cause if used to strengthen enforcement of existing regulations, pressure polluters to clean up toxic
hazards, and develop important new ecological programs
like recycling and renewable energy. Rather than spending
money and time on an unnecessary mediation mechanism,
governments and citizens groups should work to wield the
power of the state as an unambiguous force for environmental protection.
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